



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Canada and Newfoundland covet confirmation of title to portions of the territory in dispute. They have finally come to see that the way out is one of negotiation and interpretation of facts by a higher authority. Consequently the issue has been referred with power to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England, the specific question to be answered being this: "What is the location and definition of the boundary line between Canada and Newfoundland, on the Labrador peninsula?" It is a small affair, but comforting, in these days when the older methods of determining disputes between political units, such as arbitration and judicial settlement, are seemingly forgotten.

Assuming certain premises, no one can question the flawless logic of the following by William Jennings Bryan:

"When it comes time to select delegates to represent the United States in the League of Nations, provision should be made for their election by popular vote, in five districts, so that all sections of the country will be represented. They should act subject to instructions by Congress and the people. They should have no power to vote for war without special instructions from the people, at an election called for that purpose.

There are three propositions in this paragraph. We wish we could see a single chance that any one of them will ever be adopted as the practice of nations.

RUSSIA AND THE ALLIES "Politicus" and His Critic

("Politicus" is a university professor who for prudential reasons pleads anonymity. Mr. Davis, formerly Assistant Editor of the *ADVOCATE OF PEACE*, served in Russia for the Committee of Public Information during the days of the war, and since then has carefully studied life in territory under Soviet control. He is about to publish a book on Russia, giving his opinions and impressions in detail.)

By "Politicus"

It has frequently been asked by puzzled and honest citizens if the Allies have any policy with respect to Russia. The answer is, most emphatically, Yes; a far-reaching and most carefully planned policy. At least, Great Britain and France have. Whether the other Western powers, including the United States, are doing much more than drift in the offing of British imperial greatness may well be doubted. French policy has been fairly apparent for some months and may be pretty adequately summed up as an attempt to secure the repayment of the enormous loans made to Russia by French bankers through the long period in which France courted the friendship of Russia in an alliance against Germany.

But the British policy is more complex and subtle than this. British bankers also have outstanding loans, which, however, the existing Russian Government at one time indicated a willingness to assume. There are other and more cogent reasons why the British Government has been the head and front of the armed movement to destroy the Soviet Republic at all costs. One of these Lord Lansdowne expressed many months before the armistice was signed, in warning the government that a further continuance of the war was likely to let loose the forces of democracy (Lord Lansdowne preferred the term "disorder") among the peoples of Europe and destroy the existing institutions of (a privilege-ridden) society. England, perhaps more than any other European country—certainly as much as another—has cause to fear a social revolution which would destroy hereditary privilege. The other countries of Europe have had their revolutions, one after another, culminating recently in those of Russia and Germany, and the most ancient of personal and family and class privileges have been undermined, at least in their economic aspects. But in England the ruling class is confessedly a class of privilege. There, more than in any other civilized country in the world, property and family, wealth and politico-social distinction, are synonymous. The opportunistic and coalition government of Lloyd-George has heard this cry of privilege for protection and the menace of Russia—the first and most outstanding example of Lord Lansdowne's forces of "disorder"—must be met, that the world may be made safe for—privilege.

The other two motives back of British policy in Russia are just becoming clearly manifest: One is oil and the other is British imperialism in the East. Little by little the facts are filtering through the censorship to show that British support of the various rebellions against the established Soviet Government of Russia have been potentially very profitable for British capital. Immense timber concessions in the north we have known of for some weeks; but the greater prize is oil in the south. Britain, as the foremost commercial nation of the world, is especially interested in the control of oil supplies in all parts of the globe. Apparently Denikine and Kolchak have received support largely because they granted control of the rich south Russian and Siberian oil fields to British companies, whether these terms were stated frankly in the premises or not. Such concessions might have been had from the Czar's government; they may now be had from the upstart banditti and reactionary insurgents at present making war upon the established Russian Government; but from the established Russian Government itself—never. Hence the utter iniquity of the Soviet Government of Russia, which is now condemned on two points.

But the chief argument for the overthrow of the Russian Soviet Government is the menace it offers to British imperialist policy in Asia. We now see pretty clearly that for whatever purpose Mr. Wilson and our soldiers made war in Europe—and most of our soldiers *did* fight with the aim of ending wars and of defending democracy and of establishing self-determination—the British and other allied governments have had no such aims. The British tradition of imperialism, from which we in our earlier and weaker period of national youth suffered so many injustices and insults, has not abated. From the moment the Soviet Government published the secret treaties of the empire-grabbing

powers it became more dangerous to Great Britain than Germany itself. The old Russia was a menace to British Asiatic ambitions because of active competition for territory. The new Russian Government is a greater menace, because of the implied threat to champion the cause of the weaker and exploited powers in Asia against the aggressions of British imperialism.

This suspicion of the motives of Russia was confirmed when the Russian Government exchanged notes with the Amir of Afghanistan encouraging him in defending the sovereignty of his country against the British Empire in India. Russian propaganda in India and Persia and Russian example to Ireland added fuel to the flame. Russia's central position would render her all-powerful in Asia, once the rich lands of Siberia were developed and railroads had spread over her vast open territory. A democratic Russia, unfavorable to imperialistic policies and friendly to democratic self-determination in all lands, spelt the ruin of British plans to dominate the commerce and politics of the world. She would not only hold the flank of the chain of south Asian empires organized under British control, but through the open road of the Dardanelles she might thrust a relieving column into the very heart of a revolutionary Africa itself and sever British connection with the east through the Suez.

Clearly there is not room in the same world for an imperialistic Britain and a democratic Russia. The time to strike is now, before the new democracy becomes organized. That the striking was done as secretly as possible and in the name of democracy is only additional evidence, if any were needed, of the perfidy of autocracy and anti-democratic policies everywhere, whether in Prussia or in Albion.

But why should the United States, at the very moment when its spokesman was denouncing secret diplomacy and declaring for self-determination of peoples and leading a crusade against autocracy in the defense of democracy, adopt the policies of England against Russia? Soviet Russia was then the only country in the world—not even excluding the United States, for all the hypocrisy of its President—which was practicing open diplomacy. It alone was declaring to the imperial peoples within its republican boundaries that they might freely set up governments for themselves. Tolerance of opinion and freedom of speech were better protected, in the Soviet part of Russia at least, at that time than in any other country, again not excepting the United States; and there was more actual economic and political democracy there than elsewhere. Why, then, should our President have furtively sent armed expeditions and munitions to Russia, financed out of emergency funds granted to him by Congress for other purposes? Why did he fear to let Congress and the people of the United States know what he was doing? Could it be that the three motives which operated in the case of the British Government also dominated Mr. Wilson? Then, for whom did he speak and act? The masses of the American people have already repudiated his policy with reference to this warfare upon the Soviet Government. And surely we had no timber or oil interests in Russia to foster and protect. So far as we have heard, we had only a railway commission. Certainly, we had no unwilling Asian empire in process of being outflanked by the forces of democracy.

What, then, was our part in the game? Did Mr. Wilson get caught in the tangled meshes of his own secret diplo-

macy, of which he has been the most ardent practical (not vocal) exponent who ever filled our presidential chair? Or was his timid soul actually frightened by the British and French fairy tales told, Phœnician-like, to frighten us away from support of that veritable Scylla and Charybdis of democracy? It is my guess that our Russian policy is the irresponsible result of one of Mr. Wilson's personal trades at diplomacy—that he gave concrete adherence to the Allied policy in Soviet Russia in exchange for vague and nominal support on their part of his fourteen points or some other product of his rhetorical day-dreaming and moral philosophizing with which to justify to the American people his course in having led them into a war for democracy which turned out to be in defense of secret treaties. How far astray this surmise is we shall know when Mr. Wilson chooses to enlighten us as to what his motives really were. Certain it is that we, or those to whom we entrusted our affairs, have had full share in the secret diplomatic trading with regard to the destinies of nations. We differ mainly from the others in that we have more deficits and fewer profits to show as our reward from the game.

What should be our policy with regard to Russia, now that the motives back of the allied policies have been disclosed? It must be clear that we are only fighting Great Britain's imperialistic battles. It would probably be unjust to say that Mr. Wilson knew this all the while, however little of a compliment to his exercise of the function of his office it may be to absolve him of guilt. We can forgive errors, even as radical as this, in a government if only it is capable of learning from its mistakes and of righting its policies. It would seem that now we could do no less than abandon our unholy alliance with imperialism and autocracy against Soviet Russia and bring away our troops and munitions.

By Malcolm W. Davis

"*Politicus's*" analysis of the motives of French and British policy toward revolutionary Russia I am inclined to think is right in its main points. Incidentally, the policy runs very much further back than the days of the Soviet Republic. The attitude of the Allies toward revolutionary Russia was, probably inevitably, dominated from the first by this anxiety for the security of investments and for assuring Russia's continuance as a factor in the war against Germany, rather than by a disinterested concern for the welfare of Russia herself. Incidentally, to say this, either in private or in public, seems to me like whispering the dread secret that J. P. Morgan & Company are concerned in making profits from investments, or that some American interests would like to precipitate intervention in Mexico.

As for the statement of American policy given by your camouflaged Bolshevik correspondent, it seems to me to be quite inadequate, as well as completely vitiated in any case by the obvious bitter prejudice against President Wilson showing throughout. I pretty much cancel out all opinions, either of ranting pro-Wilsonites or ranting anti-Wilsonites nowadays, myself. It is one issue on which people are not sane; and the moment it is introduced it warps, like the fixed idea of a monomaniac, all their other judgments. One of the surprising experiences, upon coming home, was to find people so rabid in their Wilson obsessions. Wilson is not the issue. The issue is one of principles, and any President is merely an instrument for applying them. Like all of us

human beings, he must inevitably be a faulty instrument, unable to measure up to all the demands of his job, as most men would not be able to do. Even so, I think that the President has done better than any of his vocal opponents could have done. My guess is that he has tried to do his best; and certainly the cause is not helped by snarling. Anybody who runs down the President and attacks his character anonymously does a base thing which is unworthy of any American. Nothing is to be gained by praising or blaming the President. That is all beside the point. Keep the discussion centered on the main issues.

I am no more completely satisfied with the policy in Russia than I am with all the details of the peace treaty and the League of Nations, or than I suppose anybody else is. I am for taking what we have got, though, rather than committing the whole issue to chaos again. I think we will do better by improving what we have than by knocking it down and starting again in the ruins. I feel the same about Russia, knowing a little of the difficulties which have hampered our action in Russia and Siberia, unless we were willing to risk all the consequences everywhere which would follow if we simply drew out, repudiated our association with the Allies, and stood alone on our own policy. Some points have been gained through our influence by staying in. We have been a big restraining and liberalizing force in the Siberian situation, although we may not have increased our immediate popularity with various controlling factions by the attitude which American representatives have consistently taken. The only people who advocate arbitrarily pulling out are people who sympathize, openly or secretly, with the Bolsheviks; and even they apparently do not consider that our withdrawal might not necessarily mean that all other forces would withdraw. My guess is that the reactionaries would turn to any source from which they felt they could get support, throw all liberal and democratic elements out of the Siberian Government, and start big trouble throughout Siberia which would develop into a guerrilla civil war. If you'd rather have that than the present situation, advocate withdrawal.

My opinion is that the best thing we can do for Russia is to hold the Siberian situation steady, if possible, continuing railway and Red Cross aid, and to exert all the influence we can toward recognition of the representative democratic elements which have been slowly gaining influence in the Siberian administration, at the same time withholding any official recognition of any government for whose existence at all we, together with the other Allies, are partly responsible, until such time as a freely elected constitutional convention can be held. We should strive to secure a cessation of the civil warfare and the raising of the food blockade as soon as possible. My guess is that one strong factor which is keeping Russia temporarily Bolshevik is the psychology of the war and the blockade, and that Russia would not stay Bolshevik long under normal conditions. What the mass of Russians really wanted and what they would still desire is a constitutional convention to determine political and economic questions. Witness the difficulties of the Bolsheviks with the peasants over the question of communizing landholdings. If a constitutional convention were freely and fairly elected, it would probably be a Social-Revolutionary convention, by majority, with also a big block of Menshevik Social-Democrats. It might even retain the Soviets as one

form of administrative agency. American policy should be to secure for Russians the opportunity for such a convention as soon as possible, and to recognize any government freely and fairly chosen and established by true representatives of the people.

The suggestion that the existing Soviet Republic is a "democracy" is an amusing misrepresentation or misconception of the facts. The Soviet Republic, under Bolshevik domination, started out to be a compulsory communism, with opponents disfranchised. I know, for I lived in it and saw elections in it. I have seen a workers' union disfranchised upon the overwhelming election of anti-Bolshevik delegates to its municipal Soviet. The Bolsheviks organized a union in its place to choose Soviet delegates. The Bolsheviks themselves do not pretend to be "Democrats." They make a point of denying not only political, but also economic, privileges to persons not taking the oath of allegiance to their government and agreeing to submit to its principles. They have made concessions only where absolutely forced to do so for expediency. *The Bolshevik State is a proletarocracy, and should not be confused with a democracy.* Such a government may or may not be admirable, but it is important not to disguise it as something which it does not pretend to be. It is important to know whether we believe in a society organized fundamentally upon a theory of the rights of man as worker or upon the basis of the rights of man as citizen. It is important to know whether we are to consider the State as composed of an aggregation of economic units or of human beings. This is a premise to all further thought.

Furthermore, your correspondent's statement that there was more freedom of speech and publication in Soviet Russia than in any other country in the world is weird. I happened to be engaged in the particular business of dealing with the press throughout Russia and Siberia under the Bolsheviks, and I know that, while in Moscow some opposition papers were allowed to exist subject to constant surveillance and censorship and occasional suppression, in the provinces they were generally suppressed, even Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik Social-Democratic papers, not to mention Constitutional Democratic papers.

The Bolsheviks seized power by violence in the capitals early in November, 1917. They held elections for a constitutional convention about three weeks after their seizure of power. Even with control of the polls, they failed to get more than about one-third of the seats in the convention. The Social-Revolutionaries, the old revolutionary party, got more than one-half of the seats. The Bolsheviks dissolved the assembly by force when its members attempted to meet in Petrograd in January, 1918. They also suppressed the peasant and the Co-operative Union opposition to their policies. They have ruled since then by organized compulsion, economic discrimination, and exclusion of opponents from any political opportunity to make opposition effective.

Those are the issues. As between any faction whatever, Bolshevik or non-Bolshevik, and the Russian people as a whole, I am for the Russian people. America's endeavor should be to use her influence so that it will secure and advance, not the interest of any separate Russian group, but the welfare of the great Russian nation, upon the basis of the desire of all its people freely expressed.